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discuss strategies for making certain that the advice
practitioners provide after June 20 will be in compliance with the circular. They also provide a decision
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Introduction
In a recent article published in Tax Notes,1 we discussed the application of Circular 230 to estate planning.
We made seven specific recommendations, hoping to
make it more likely that the circular’s underlying objectives would be achieved without imposing unnecessary
burdens on practitioners or their clients. Several professional organizations also made suggestions to simplify
the application of the circular and reduce its scope.2 The
Treasury Department on May 18 amended the final
regulations. Unfortunately, most recommendations made
were not adopted.3 As a result, and as this article will
discuss, the circular continues to represent a significant
imposition on tax practitioners and their clients and
almost certainly will increase the cost of the delivery of
legal and other professional written advice on almost any
federal tax issue.
In this article, we explore Treasury’s revisions and
then provide guidelines that we hope will be useful to

1
J. Blattmachr, M. Gans, and T. Bentley, ‘‘The Application of
Circular 230 in Estate Planning,’’ Tax Notes, Apr. 4, 2005, p. 61.
2
See, for example, ‘‘American College of Trust and Estate
Counsel Comments on Circular 230 Regulations,’’ Doc 20057566, 2005 TNT 71-30 (Apr. 14, 2005); ‘‘Association of the Bar of
the City of New York Comments on Circular 230 Regulations,’’
Doc 2005-11435, 2005 TNT 101-26 (May 13, 2005); ‘‘New York
State Bar Association, Tax Section, Report on Circular 230
Regulations,’’ Doc 2005-4484, 2005 TNT 43-56 (Mar. 7, 2005);
‘‘Comments on Final Regulations Issued Under Circular 230 of
the American Bar Association Section of Real Property, Probate
and Trust Law,’’ Doc 2005-10167, 2005 TNT 90-23 (May 11, 2005).
3
As will be discussed in detail below, probably the most
important amendment made by the May 18 changes was a
‘‘clarification’’ of principal purpose by adopting a test set forth
in Treas. reg. section 1.6662-4(g)(2)(ii). Although we mentioned
this test in our April 4 article as a way to define principal
purpose, we do not claim that the Treasury Department made
the principal purpose change on account of our article.
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I. Constitutional and Statutory Questions
In our prior article, we suggested that, in the transfertax context, there was a lack of congruence between the
circular and the penalty rules contained in the code. We
went on to argue that, as a result, the circular violates the
First Amendment. In this section, after rehearsing the
lack-of-congruence analysis and the resulting First
Amendment implications, we turn to an additional argument: that the Treasury Department, in creating that
incongruence, exceeded the authority it has been given
by Congress. We then raise the question whether professional organizations will undertake litigation to invalidate the circular insofar as it fails to maintain congruence
with the code.
Under the circular, written advice concerning a principal purpose transaction constitutes a Covered Opinion.
As such, the opinion must reach a more likely than not
conclusion regarding any Significant Federal Tax Issue or
it must state that it cannot be relied on by the taxpayer for
penalty protection purposes regarding that issue.4 Thus,
for a principal purpose transaction, a practitioner may
not give an opinion that there is a reasonable basis for the
desired treatment of a Significant Federal Tax Issue
without stating that the taxpayer may not rely on it in
defending against the imposition of a penalty. Under the
code, in contrast, a taxpayer can avoid penalties regarding certain tax issues, such as a transfer-tax issue, if the
position is taken in good faith and based on reasonable
cause.5 Therefore, for transfer tax issues for example,6
while a taxpayer may rely on professional advice that
there is a reasonable basis for the claimed position to
avoid a penalty,7 the circular prevents the practitioner

4

See Circular 230, section 10.35(e)(4).
See section 6664(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
as amended (the code). Section references are to the code except
where otherwise noted.
6
For a discussion of the lack-of-congruence potential outside
of the transfer tax context, see nn.60-71 and accompanying text
in our earlier article.
7
Treas. reg. section 1.6662-3(b) indicates that, if there is a
reasonable basis for the position, the taxpayer is not negligent.
It then references Treas. reg. section 1.6664-4, which provides
that the negligence penalty can be defeated if the taxpayer had
reasonable cause and was in good faith. Thus, if the taxpayer
receives a reasonable basis opinion, that should provide a
defense against the negligence penalty. Note, however, that
Treas. reg. section 1.6664-4(c) provides that a professional opinion will not defeat a penalty if the taxpayer did not reasonably
rely on it in good faith. See Santa Monica Pictures LLC v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-104, Doc 2005-10308, 2005 TNT
91-12 (imposing the substantial-understatement-of-income-tax
penalty in a tax shelter context after rejecting the taxpayer’s
substantial authority argument because none of the opinions
reached a more likely than not conclusion and then rejecting the
taxpayer’s section 6664 argument on the different ground that
the taxpayer could not have reasonably relied in good faith on
the legal opinions that had been secured). See also U.S. v. Boyle,
5

from issuing such an opinion unless it contains an
advisory that reliance is not permitted.
This lack of congruence that the circular produces
cannot be squared with the First Amendment. While the
government can certainly require attorneys or other
practitioners to make certain disclosures to their clients, it
can do so only when there is an appropriate justification.
In our earlier article, we based our First Amendment
analysis, in part, on the Supreme Court decision in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court.8
In Zauderer, the state bar required lawyers who advertised contingency-fee services to include in the advertisement a disclosure to the effect that the client would
remain responsible for certain costs if the lawsuit were to
fail. In upholding the disclosure requirement over a First
Amendment challenge, the Court explained that mandatory disclosure rules can be justified by the government’s
interest in preventing consumer deception.9
If, for example, the code permitted taxpayers to escape
a penalty only if they first secured a more likely than not
opinion, the circular could certainly require a practitioner
to disclose that reliance on a reasonable basis opinion is
not a valid defense against the imposition of a penalty.
The justification for requiring the practitioner to make
such a disclosure would be the government’s concern
about preventing taxpayers from being misled. Thus,
when the circular and the code are congruent in that both
require a more likely than not opinion, no First Amendment challenge could be asserted.10 For some income-tax
shelters the circular permissibly can require, as it does, a
more likely than not opinion given that the code similarly
requires the taxpayer subjectively to believe that to be the
case to defeat the penalty.11 However, in the transfer tax
context for example, where a reasonable basis opinion
can suffice for penalty-protection purposes, the government cannot defend the disclaimer that the circular
mandates by pointing to a taxpayer-deception concern.
In short, as suggested in our prior article, free discourse
between practitioners and clients is unjustifiably undermined if the code permits taxpayers to assert a reasonable
basis opinion as a defense while the circular, at the same

469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985) (indicating that, when the code is
unclear, a taxpayer may avoid a penalty by showing reasonable
cause through reliance on professional opinion).
8
471 U.S. 626 (1985).
9
See 476 U.S. at 651-53.
10
When government seeks to regulate speech when it could
effectively address its concerns without doing so — for example,
by amending the penalty provisions in the code — the constraint of the First Amendment becomes particularly critical. See
Thompson v. Western States Medical Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
(‘‘If the First Amendment means anything, it means that regulating speech must be a last — not first — resort. Yet here it
seems to have been the first strategy the Government thought to
try.’’)
11
See section 6664(d)(2)(C) (requiring the taxpayer, in the case
of Listed and Reportable Transactions, reasonably to believe the
position was more likely than not the correct one to defeat the
penalty).

(Footnote continued in next column.)
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practitioners in implementing the circular’s requirements. Before doing so, however, we examine two arguments that we believe lead to the conclusion that the
circular, at least in certain contexts, is invalid.
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In any challenge to the validity of the circular, however, it is unlikely that the courts would find it necessary
to resolve the First Amendment question. The courts seek
to avoid a constitutional question whenever a case can be
resolved on statutory grounds instead.13 Indeed, when an
agency adopts a regulation that raises constitutional
questions, the courts will refuse to find that the agency
had the authority to promulgate it absent a clear indication in the statute.14 Thus, if the circular is challenged on
the ground that it fails to maintain congruence with the
code, the specter of constitutional invalidity would likely
lead the court to conclude that the Treasury did not have
the statutory authority to promulgate it. As will be
discussed next, Congress did not indicate any intent —
let alone a clear intent — to authorize the Treasury to use
the circular as a vehicle to override the code.

The question thus becomes whether Treasury had the
authority to require in the circular that all written advice
concerning a principal purpose transaction designed to
provide penalty protection be accompanied by a more
likely than not conclusion when Congress provided so
unambiguously just a few months earlier that this standard would apply only in the limited category of certain
tax shelters. While under the Supreme Court’s Chevron
doctrine,16 the authority of an agency to issue regulations
under a statute it administers is quite expansive,17 it is
not without limits.
In Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,18 the Food and Drug Administration sought to
regulate tobacco products. Under the FDA’s governing
statute, any exercise of jurisdiction would have necessarily resulted in a complete ban given the health risks
involved and the statutory requirement that the FDA
remove from the marketplace unsafe products that fail to
offer a therapeutic benefit. Despite the broad deference
that agencies’ regulations enjoy under Chevron, the Court
held that the FDA lacked statutory authority to ban
tobacco and therefore that the regulation was invalid.
The Court first examined various pieces of legislation in
which Congress had imposed regulations on tobacco (for
example, regulations on labeling and advertising). From
that, the Court inferred that Congress intended that
tobacco would remain a legitimate product. Thus, the
Court held, Congress made sufficiently clear in its
tobacco-regulating legislation its intent to permit the
product to remain viable, thereby leaving the FDA without the regulatory authority that would have inexorably
led to a ban.19 In the jargon of Chevron, when Congress
unambiguously resolves an issue, the agency may not
adopt a contrary approach.

In October 2004 Congress enacted the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-357). In that legislation,
Congress amended section 6664, somewhat altering the
elements of the defense that taxpayers must establish to
avoid some penalties (that is, the penalties imposed
under sections 6662, 6662A, and 6663). The section, as
amended, continues in essence a two-tier framework: For
some tax shelters (now defined as Listed and Reportable
Transactions, which are the subject of a penalty under
new section 6662A), the taxpayer must establish a reasonable belief that the position was more likely than not
the correct one. In all other cases (including, as a practical
matter, all transfer tax cases),15 a more likely than not
standard is not imposed. Instead, the taxpayer merely
must establish reasonable cause and good faith — which,
as suggested, can be accomplished by reliance on a
professional’s reasonable basis opinion. In creating that
framework, Congress could not have expressed itself
more clearly. Indeed, as indicated, it continued the pattern under the preamendment version of the section,
which similarly required a more likely than not standard
for tax shelters and a less rigorous standard in other
cases.

Similarly, here, by repeatedly adopting a two-tier
framework for penalties under which the rigorous more
likely than not standard applies only in a limited category of cases, Congress made clear that in other cases
taxpayers should be able to secure and rely on reasonable
basis opinions supplied by professionals.20 Yet the circular ignores that framework and precludes practitioners

12
See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 636-37 (9th Cir. 2002)
(discussing the First Amendment rights of doctor and patient to
communicate freely with each other). See also Legal Services Corp.
v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). For a further discussion of
Conant and the First Amendment issue, see our earlier article.
13
See, e.g., I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (resolving
statutory ambiguity to avoid confronting the constitutional
question).
14
See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corp of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (‘‘Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of
Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress
intended that result.’’).
15
As indicated in our prior article, estate planning transactions are currently not subject to the penalty under section
6662A (that is, they do not constitute a Reportable Transaction,
and no estate planning transaction currently is considered a
Listed Transaction).

16
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
17
See Mitchell M. Gans, ‘‘Deference and the End of Tax
Practice,’’ 36 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 731 (2002).
18
529 U.S. 120 (2000).
19
For a further discussion of Brown & Williamson, see Gans,
supra note 17.
20
In Brown & Williamson, the Court emphasized that the FDA
had conceded, before adopting the regulation at issue, that it did
not have jurisdiction to regulate tobacco. The Court alluded to
this concession to support its conclusion that Congress had
intended to ratify the FDA’s understanding and to continue the
regulation of tobacco without giving the FDA authority to
regulate (ban) it. See 529 U.S. at 157. Here, as well, the Treasury
made clear to Congress its view of the law, adopting the two-tier
framework in Treas. reg. section 1.6664-4. And, as in Brown &
Williamson, Congress, in turn, in amending section 6664, sought
to continue that framework.
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time, precludes practitioners from giving such advice in
writing without including a disclaimer that renders the
advice worthless.12
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The circular stands on even weaker ground than the
regulation in Brown & Williamson. Unlike the FDA’s
regulation, the circular raises constitutional questions.
And, as suggested, in such a case, the courts are less
willing to defer under Chevron, requiring the agency to
demonstrate instead that Congress had a clear intent to
confer the authority the agency claims. Given the penalty
provisions Congress has embedded in the code, the
Treasury’s burden will be considerable should the circular be challenged.
The argument that the circular is invalid could be
asserted in one of two ways. It could be raised as a
defense by a practitioner charged with violating the
circular. Or a professional organization could probably
bring suit before any disciplinary violation is alleged,
claiming that it is invalid on its face (as opposed to an
argument that it is invalid as applied to a particular
practitioner). While facial challenges can be problematic
and perhaps difficult to sustain, the courts are particularly receptive when First Amendment issues are implicated.22 In terms of bringing a facial challenge, it would
seem that a professional organization representing practitioners who work, for example, in the estate planning
area would make an excellent candidate to be a plaintiff
given that the lack of congruence is particularly acute in
this area.23 Challenges designed to obtain judicial intervention before engaging in conduct that might be sanctionable are not unusual.24 Given the risks involved in
ignoring the circular and the costs that compliance will

21
In the statute authorizing the Treasury to regulate practitioners, 31 USC 330, the Treasury is authorized to create
standards applicable to the rendering of written advice concerning an entity or transaction having the potential for tax avoidance or tax evasion. See 31 USC 330(d). While that statute
certainly gives the Treasury the authority to issue the circular, it
does not give it the authority to render meaningless the two-tier
framework that Congress recently decided to retain.
22
See, for example, U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (discussing the rigorous standards employed by the courts when a facial
challenge is brought if the First Amendment is not implicated).
It should be noted that the Supreme Court just recently decided
to review the continuing viability of Salerno. See Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of Northern New England, __ S. Ct. __, 2005 wl 483164
(May 23, 2005) (granting cert.). For a further discussion on the
ripeness question, see City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d
1160 (9th Cir. 2001).
23
Such practitioners often give advice on principal purpose
transactions, and, as suggested, the penalty applicable in the
transfer tax context (the negligence penalty) can be defeated
with a reasonable basis opinion.
24
See, e.g., New York State Bar Ass’n v. F.T.C., 276 F. Supp.2d
110 (D.D.C. 2003) (challenging the application of the privacy law
by the FTC to lawyers).
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necessarily entail, it would seem likely that a professional
organization will initiate such a challenge.

II. Brief Background About June 21 Changes
Broadly, the changes made in December and that
become effective after June 20 relate to two areas. One
area is contained in section 10.35 of the circular. It
prescribes rules that must be followed in providing a
written statement about a federal tax matter that constitutes a ‘‘Covered Opinion.’’ Any written statement about
any federal tax issue should be tested to determine if it is
a Covered Opinion and, if so, what kind it constitutes.
The specific requirements prescribed for a Covered Opinion vary depending on the type of Covered Opinion
involved. A written statement may constitute more than
one type of Covered Opinion. Even if the written statement about a federal tax issue is not a Covered Opinion,
so it need not comply with the requirements of section
10.35, the practitioner must comply with section 10.37
dealing with general requirements for written advice on
federal tax issues that is not a Covered Opinion and
section 10.34 dealing with return related advice (whether
oral or in writing). A practitioner who recklessly, willfully, or by reason of gross incompetency fails to comply
with Circular 230 may be suspended or disbarred from
practice before the IRS, be publicly censured, or be fined.
Practice before the IRS includes preparing and filing tax
returns and representing a taxpayer in an examination of
a return. Failure to comply might also serve as evidence
in determining professional liability.
It is important to note that although section 10.35 of
the circular refers to ‘‘written advice,’’ it covers much
more than what probably most practitioners would regard as a ‘‘formal’’ opinion or advice regarding a federal
tax issue. It seems to cover any written statement about a
federal tax issue even if no conclusion is stated.25

A. Brief Overview of Section 10.35
A chart made part of our original article on the circular
sets forth an overview of the changes made by section
10.35. A revised chart reflecting the changes just made is
attached at the end of this article.
A Covered Opinion may be any written statement by
a practitioner concerning one or more federal tax issues
arising in three areas: (1) statements involving Listed
Transactions; (2) statements relating to an arrangement
the principal purpose of which is avoidance or evasion of
federal tax; or (3) statements relating to arrangements a
significant purpose of which is avoidance or evasion of
federal tax. Certain written statements are excluded from
constituting Covered Opinions. The May 18 changes add
three new areas of exclusions. Also, the May 18 changes
seek to provide guidance to determine if the principal
purpose of the arrangement is the evasion or avoidance
of federal tax. The May 18 amendments also ‘‘relax’’ what
constitutes a ‘‘prominently displayed’’ disclaimer (which,

25

Note, for example, that a Covered Opinion is required, as a
general rule, to reach a conclusion and not merely provide a
discussion or recite the law. See Circular 230, section 10.35
(c)(3)(ii).
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from supplying this kind of written opinion on a Significant Federal Tax Issue in all principal purpose transactions. It would seem that the Treasury sought to do
indirectly (through the circular) what it was unable to
achieve directly (in Congress). However broad an agency’s authority under Chevron, the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown & Williamson makes clear that it does not
extend that far.21
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B. The Circular as Revised
1. Excluded writings. Section 10.35 as promulgated in
December excluded certain written statements from constituting Covered Opinions. The first exclusion is written
advice provided during the course of an engagement if
the practitioner is reasonably expected to provide subsequent written advice to the client that will satisfy the
requirements for Covered Opinions.26 The second broad
exception, which does not apply to Listed Transactions or
any arrangement the principal purpose of which is tax
avoidance (or evasion), applies to advice that concerns
qualification of a qualified plan, a state or local bond
opinion,27 or is included in documents required to be
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.28
The May 18 changes add three new areas of exclusion:
certain written advice after a tax return is filed;29 certain
advice provided to an employer by in-house counsel;30
and certain written statements in which the practitioner
concludes that a transaction is not appropriate or that one
or more federal tax issues will not be resolved in the
taxpayer’s favor.31 Although each of those new exclusions, as discussed below, is somewhat limited, none fails
to apply by reason of relating to a Listed Transaction or a
principal purpose transaction.
a. Written advice after the return is filed. A written
statement is excluded when it is provided after the
taxpayer has filed a tax return with the IRS if it is solely
for use by the taxpayer and if the practitioner neither
knows nor has reason to know that the advice will be
used by the taxpayer to take a position on a tax return
(including an amended return that claims ‘‘tax benefits’’
not reported on a previously filed return) filed after the
date on which the advice is provided to the practitioner.
The requirement of this exclusion that the advice be
solely for the use by the taxpayer seems somewhat
reminiscent of the definition of a Marketed Opinion,
which is a written statement the practitioner knows or
has reason to know the opinion will be used or referred
to by a person other than the practitioner in promoting,
marketing, or recommending an arrangement to one or
more taxpayers. In any case, there seem to be at least two
ways to construe the term ‘‘solely’’ in this context. One is
that if the written statement ultimately is used by someone other than the client to whom it was rendered (for
example, the client shares it with another who uses it),
the exclusion does not apply (as it has failed the ‘‘solely’’
requirement) even if the practitioner did not know or
have reason to know that the client would allow another
to use it. That would be a harsh result as the practitioner

26

Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(A).
The IRS has issued interim guidance for Circular 230
compliance for opinions related to state and local bonds. See
Notice 2005-47; 2005-26 IRB 1, Doc 2005-12432, 2005 TNT 109-9.
28
Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(B).
29
Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(C).
30
Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(D).
31
Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(E).

would then be found to have failed to comply with the
circular even though he or she had no reason to know it
would be so used — even harsher than the Marketed
Opinion rule. Perhaps the practitioner in such a case
would easily defend not complying because he did not
know or have reason to know another would use it.
Another construction of ‘‘solely’’ is that meeting this
requirement turns on the practitioner’s view or position
that it is solely for the taxpayer’s use. In other words, the
‘‘solely’’ requirement is based on the intention of the
practitioner, not the intention of the taxpayer or the
practitioner’s expectation as to how the taxpayer will use
the advice. This second construction of the term could
provide a large exception to the Marketed Opinion
requirements: The promoter files a return relating to a
certain transaction and then seeks advice from the practitioner regarding the transaction. As long as the practitioner intends the advice to be solely for the taxpayer’s
use the written statement is not a Marketed Opinion,
even if the practitioner has reason to know the taxpayer
(or someone else to whom the taxpayer delivers a copy of
the advice) will use it for marketing purposes.
A third possible meaning is that the written advice
will be regarded as solely for the taxpayer’s use unless
the practitioner knows or has reason to know it will be
used by another. Although that might be the most
sensible meaning, the language in the exclusion does not
support it — another part of the rule, as recited above,
uses the ‘‘knows or has reason to know’’ requirement but
the ‘‘solely’’ requirement does not. So it is somewhat
troubling to read it into the latter.
It seems important for Treasury to clarify the meaning
of ‘‘solely’’ as used in this exclusion.
As written, it seems that if the taxpayer claims tax
benefits by filing an amended return, for example, on the
same date32 the written advice is delivered, the exclusion
applies (provided the solely requirement is met). It seems
doubtful that Treasury intended to provide such an
exclusion from Covered Opinion status merely because
the taxpayer took a position on the same day the written
statement was delivered. Again, it may not seem prudent
to rely on this exclusion if the practitioner knows or has
reason to know the taxpayer will take a position on a tax
return based on the advice when the tax return is filed on
the same day that the written statement is delivered.
Again, the Treasury should clarify this matter.
b. Written advice provided by taxpayer’s in-house
counsel. Written advice provided to an employer by a
practitioner in the practitioner’s capacity as an employee
solely for purposes of determining the tax liability of the
employer is excluded. The exclusion is, however, a limited one. It does not, for example, exclude a written
statement made by an employee that is to be used to
educate other employees of the employer (for example,
an in-house trust counsel of a bank who prepares a
memorandum about Circular 230) or for distribution to

27
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32

The exclusion requires that the taxpayer not use the written
advice to file another return (including an amended return) after
the date of the written advice relating to the previously filed
return.
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depending on the circumstances, may be required to
avoid Covered Opinion status or to comply with the
Covered Opinion rules).
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33
The circular’s apparent scope is so broad that merely
describing a particular tax arrangement without explicitly stating any tax result (for example, ‘‘[s]ome individuals may wish to
consider creating a trust for his or her own benefit the remainder of which will pass to our organization on the death of the
individual’’) might be regarded as making a written statement
about a federal tax issue because there is an implication of a
federal tax effect (for example, a deduction for the value of the
remainder created for charity).
34
A federal tax issue is a question concerning the federal tax
treatment of an item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit,
the existence or absence of a taxable transfer of property, or the
value of property for federal tax purposes. A federal tax issue is
significant if the IRS has a reasonable basis for a successful
challenge and its resolution could have a significant impact,
whether beneficial or adverse under any reasonably foreseeable
circumstance, on the overall federal tax treatment of the transaction(s) or matter(s) addressed in the writing. In other words,
in addition to tax avoidance being a significant purpose of the
arrangement, a federal tax issue must be significant for the
writing to constitute a Reliance Opinion (and the level of
confidence the practitioner reaches on a Significant Federal Tax
Issue must be at least more likely than not).
35
Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(4)(ii).
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relates to a Listed Transaction or to a principal purpose
transaction, a writing is not a Marketed Opinion, however, if it prominently discloses in the written advice that:
(1) the advice was not intended or written by the
practitioner to be used, and that it cannot be used by any
taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding penalties that may
be imposed on the taxpayer; (2) the advice was written to
support the promotion or marketing of the transaction(s)
or matter(s) addressed in the written advice; and (3) the
taxpayer should seek advice based on the taxpayer’s
particular circumstances from an independent tax adviser.36 In other words, if it is known that others will refer
to or use the opinion in promoting an arrangement, it is
a Marketed Opinion if it relates to a Listed Transaction or
its principal purpose is tax avoidance (or evasion)37 even
if it contains the three ‘‘you cannot rely’’ disclaimers.
The May 18 changes relax the requirement that any
prominent disclosure be in bold typeface larger than any
other contained in the written statement. The changes
provide that an item is prominently disclosed if it is
readily apparent to a reader of the advice. However, the
change is qualified in that the determination of whether
an item is ‘‘readily apparent’’ to the reader will depend
on the facts and circumstances surrounding the advice,
including, but not limited to, the sophistication of the
taxpayer and the length of the written advice. As is
discussed in more detail below, it may be that practitioners should place the disclosure at the beginning of the
written statement. In any case, at a minimum, the disclosure must be set forth in a separate section (and not a
footnote alone) in a typeface at least as large as the
typeface of any discussion of the facts or law in the
written statement.
That is a welcome practical change, because it would
appear to permit the name of the practitioner’s firm and,
perhaps, the title of the written statement to be larger
than the tax advice itself.
3. Definition of principal purpose. The most onerous
rules under the circular apply to written statements
relating to Listed Transactions and principal purpose
transactions. As originally promulgated in December, the
circular provided no guidance as to how a practitioner
should determine the principal purpose of an arrangement. The May 18 changes do provide some guidance.
First, Treasury considered the possibility that the transaction might have multiple motivations. Under the
change, the principal purpose of the transaction is the
one that exceeds (presumably in importance) the other
purposes. Second, in a potentially much more important
change, Treasury has created a new safe harbor, which
we now examine.

36

The latter two requirements are repeated in section
10.35(e)(2) of the circular relating to certain required disclosures.
37
It is unclear whose principal purpose applies here, that of
the promoter or that of the taxpayer to whom the arrangement
is offered. It the context in which it appears (that is, determining
if it is a Marketed Opinion), it seems to be that of the promoter.
Otherwise, it could be the principal purpose of one taxpayer but
not of another, making it a Marketed Opinion regarding the first
and not the second.
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others (for example, an in-house lawyer who prepares a
brochure for her employer that is a charitable organization about how donors may contribute to the organization and that mentions tax consequences of the contribution).33
c. Negative written advice. The exclusion for written
advice provided to a taxpayer that concludes that a
transaction is not appropriate or that one or more federal
tax issues will not be resolved in the taxpayer’s favor
applies only if the statement does not reach a conclusion
that suggests at any level of confidence that the taxpayer
might prevail. For example, the negative advice exclusion
does not apply if the practitioner concludes that the
treatment in favor of the taxpayer is not frivolous, that
the taxpayer has a realistic possibility of success, that
there is a reasonable basis for taking the position, or that
there is substantial authority for the position. In other
words, merely because the practitioner reaches a confidence level lower than more likely than not that the
taxpayer would prevail does not allow the negative
advice exclusion to apply if the practitioner advises, for
example, that taking the position would be nonfrivolous.
2. Prominent disclosure. A written statement may avoid
being a Covered Opinion by reason of constituting a
Reliance Opinion (a written statement about a Significant
Federal Tax Issue34 relating to an arrangement a significant purpose of which is tax avoidance or evasion) if it
‘‘prominently discloses in the written advice that it was
not intended or written by the practitioner to be used,
and that it cannot be used by the taxpayer, for the
purpose of avoiding penalties that may be imposed on
the taxpayer.’’35
Written advice is a Marketed Opinion and therefore is
a Covered Opinion if the practitioner knows or has
reason to know that it will be used or referred to by a
person other than the practitioner (or someone affiliated
with her firm) in promoting, marketing, or recommending an arrangement to one or more taxpayers. Unless it
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If a significant purpose were tax avoidance, Reliance
Opinion status would be avoided if the written statement
addressed no Significant Federal Tax Issue.
39
Where a taxpayer literally complies with a code provision,
the IRS may nonetheless argue that permitting the tax benefit
sought would be inconsistent with Congress’s purpose. See
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); see also Santa Monica
Pictures LLC, v. Commissioner, supra note 7. In creating two
prongs — requiring consistency with the statute and with
Congress’s purpose — the new definition may be understood as
seeking to reflect the substantive rule that derives from Gregory.
Not citing Gregory, however, the preamble indicates, as will be
discussed, that the definition was borrowed from Treas. reg.
section 1.6662-4, which creates a similar exception from the
definition of a tax shelter (taxpayers who invest in tax shelters
and who seek to avoid penalties are subjected to a heightened
standard).
40
Even though, under the clarification, it will not be treated
as a principal purpose transaction, it may nonetheless be subject
to the rules under a significant-purpose analysis. In other
words, if, as is likely, tax avoidance is a significant purpose, the
advice could nonetheless be subject to the rules. For example, if
the advice reaches a more likely than not conclusion on any
Significant Federal Tax Issue, it would be a Covered Opinion in
that a significant purpose transaction is subject to the rules if the
advice were to reach such a conclusion. It seems unlikely,
however, that the Covered Opinion rules would be applicable in
this context given the noncontroversial nature of the annual
exclusion (that is, a noncontroversial issue is not a Significant
Federal Tax Issue). See Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(3).
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with the terms of the statute and its underlying purpose.41 On the other hand, when the IRS has not made
such a concession, the analysis becomes more difficult. If,
for example, the IRS has issued a series of taxpayerfriendly private letter rulings42 — but there is no decision
or published guidance on the issue — can a practitioner
take the view that the series of rulings is tantamount to a
published revenue ruling in applying the safe harbor? Or
if federal courts of appeal of different circuits are split
about the meaning of a provision, can a practitioner rely
on language in the favorable decision to the effect that the
code contemplates the benefit in question? Or what if the
circuit in which the taxpayer resides has rejected the IRS’s
position while other circuits have adopted it? In short,
while it would seem that practitioners should be able to
treat an IRS concession in published guidance as a
definitive resolution of the code’s meaning,43 the scope of
the safe harbor remains unclear when the issue is unsettled.
The preamble indicates that the safe harbor is borrowed from the exception in Treas. reg. section 1.66624(g)(2)(ii). Perhaps, therefore, a better understanding of
the contours of the safe harbor can be obtained by
examining it through the prism of that regulation. Under
section 6662, a taxpayer who invests in a tax shelter must
satisfy a more rigorous standard to avoid the substantial
understatement penalty. The regulation defines the term
‘‘tax shelter’’ with reference to the taxpayer’s principal
purpose in entering into the transaction.44 In the language borrowed by the circular, the regulation goes on to
provide that a transaction will not be treated as a tax
shelter if the transaction has as its purpose the claiming
of ‘‘tax benefits in a manner consistent with the statute
and Congressional purpose.’’ Although the regulation
provides no further clarification as to the meaning of that
phrase, it does contain a list of examples of qualifying
transactions or elections: investments in tax-exempt
bonds designed to qualify for the exclusion under section
103; investments designed to produce accelerated depreciation deductions under section 168; investments designed to produce percentage depletion deductions under section 613 and 613A; investments designed to

41
The Tax Court has held that, as long as a taxpayer-friendly
revenue ruling has not been revoked, it will not permit the IRS
to make a contrary argument. See Rauenhorst v. Commissioner, 119
T.C. 157, Doc 2002-22803, 2002 TNT 195-13 (2002); Baker v.
Commissioner, 122 T.C. 143, Doc 2004-3555, 2004 TNT 34-9 (2004);
Dover v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 324, Doc 2004-9660, 2004 TNT
88-15 (2004).
42
Neither a private letter ruling nor a National Office technical advice memorandum may be cited or used as precedent.
Section 61101(k)(3). On the other hand, it may constitute substantial authority for purposes of section 6662. See Treas. reg.
section 1.6662-4(d).
43
All of the examples provided in Treas. reg. section 1.6662-4
are of the clear-cut variety.
44
The statute no longer uses the principal-purpose test, but
rather a significant-purpose test as indicated in our prior article.
The regulation has not yet been conformed to that code change.
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Before the amendment, as suggested in our earlier
article, written advice concerning noncontroversial transactions would have constituted a Covered Opinion if the
taxpayer’s principal purpose was tax avoidance or evasion.38 For example, under the preamendment version of
the circular, if a practitioner had recommended an
annual-exclusion gift, any written advice about the transaction would have been subject to the Covered Opinion
rules if, as seems somewhat likely, the taxpayer’s principal purpose was tax avoidance. Apparently, recognizing
that it would be inefficient to apply the rules when the
code contemplates the tax benefit in question, Treasury
has now added a clarification to the term ‘‘principal
purpose’’ that is designed to narrow the rules’ focus. In
effect, the clarification creates a safe harbor: If a transaction has as its purpose the ‘‘claiming of tax benefits in a
manner consistent with the statute and Congressional
purpose,’’ it will not be treated as a principal purpose
transaction.39 Thus, it would seem that, for an annualexclusion gift motivated solely by a tax avoidance purpose, written advice will not be subject to the principalpurpose rules, as amended, because Congress intended
to permit the exclusion.40
While the safe harbor is a welcome development,
questions will inevitably arise about its application when
the meaning of a code provision is unsettled. On one
hand, it would seem that, if the IRS has conceded the
issue in published guidance (for example, in a revenue
ruling), the Treasury should be precluded from arguing
that an outcome favoring the taxpayer is not consistent
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45
See TAM 200245053, Doc 2002-25023, 2002 TNT 218-69
(indicating that the preamble to the regulations under section
2702 contemplate that a GRAT cannot be zeroed-out).
46
Hackl v. Commissioner, 335 F.3d 664, Doc 2003-16504, 2003
TNT 135-8 (7th Cir. 2003).
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because accelerated depreciation is a code-authorized
benefit? If the taxpayer in that example is held to the tax
shelter standard because of the defeat on the substantive
issue, the regulation’s exception for code-authorized
transactions has no meaning.47 In other words, if taxpayers who lose on the substantive issue cannot take advantage of the exception, no taxpayer will be able to do so
inasmuch as penalties are not imposed on taxpayers who
prevail. Thus, to avoid rendering the exception meaningless, it must be understood as applying when, in the
context of a transaction involving a code-authorized
benefit, the taxpayer fails to prevail.
By a parity of logic, the safe harbor clarification just
added to the circular should apply in the context of the
zeroed-out GRAT and partnership-gift examples. In both
cases, the transaction involves a code-authorized benefit.
The possibility that the taxpayer might not prevail in
either case should not render the safe harbor unavailable
— just as a failure to prevail in the depreciation example
should not render the tax shelter regulation’s exception
inapplicable.
While, as suggested, it would seem appropriate to
interpret the safe harbor against the backdrop of the
regulation’s exception, it is entirely plausible that the safe
harbor was drafted without any intent to make the two
concepts mirror each other. It is even possible, moreover,
that no thought was given to the problematic way in
which the exception is drafted. After all, no clarification is
provided concerning the exception in the preamble to the
proposed or final regulations under section 6662. Thus,
while it is hoped that the conclusions reached in the
zeroed-out GRAT and partnership-gift examples appear
sound, practitioners may well find it difficult to rely on
that reading without further clarification from the Treasury. Indeed, given the nature of the comments that
inspired the safe harbor — suggesting that compliance
with the rules would be unnecessary in the case of a
code-authorized benefit even if tax avoidance is the
taxpayer’s principal purpose — it may well be that
Treasury intended that it would apply only when the
issue is entirely noncontroversial (for example, advice
that a client make an annual-exclusion cash gift).48
Even when the IRS has conceded the issue in published guidance, factual issues may make it difficult for
the practitioner to comfortably invoke the safe harbor.
For example, while the IRS has conceded that a Crummey
power creates a present interest,49 the annual exclusion

47
In our prior article, we suggested this possibility. See n.65 of
that article.
48
But, of course, if the intent was to limit the safe harbor to
noncontroversial issues, the amendment adds very little to the
preamendment version of the Covered Opinion rules. For,
under the preamended version, in the case of a Covered
Opinion, only Significant Federal Tax Issues needed to be
addressed. And because a noncontroversial issue would seem to
include a Significant Federal Tax Issue, there was no need to
address noncontroversial issues under the preamendment version of the rules — suggesting that a safe harbor that creates an
exception to the Covered Opinion rules only when the issues are
noncontroversial is not very meaningful.
49
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 85-24, 1985-1 C.B. 329.
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produce a deduction for intangible drilling expenses
under section 263(c)); establishment of a qualified retirement plan in accordance with sections 401-409; or subchapter S elections.
Given the nature of the items included in that list, one
might reasonably infer that only transactions that the
code explicitly validates can qualify. One might further
infer that, because the circular borrows the concept from
the regulation, that limited interpretation of the regulation should apply with equal force in the context of the
circular’s safe harbor. In other words, transactions will
qualify for the safe harbor under this view only if the
code explicitly validates the tax benefit in question. Thus,
as suggested, an annual-exclusion gift would qualify for
the safe harbor because the code explicitly validates the
exclusion.
Even assuming that this limited interpretation of the
safe harbor is correct, questions still remain. Consider, for
example, the application of the safe harbor in the case of
a grantor retained annuity trust (GRAT). Section 2702
explicitly authorizes the use of a GRAT. It would seem,
therefore, that advice concerning a GRAT would fall
under the safe harbor. But what if the GRAT is structured
so that the value of the remainder is zeroed-out? The IRS
has indicated that, in its view, Congress did not contemplate that taxpayers would be permitted to zero out a
GRAT.45 The question thus becomes whether, in the
context of a tax benefit the code explicitly authorizes, the
safe harbor can be rendered inapplicable because an
unsettled issue is implicated.
As another example, consider an annual-exclusion gift
of a limited partnership interest. What if, as in Hackl,46
under the partnership agreement, a sale of the gifted
interest by the donee would not confer full partnership
status on the purchaser (for example, the purchaser
would become a mere assignee)? Would the safe harbor
apply on the rationale that the taxpayer was seeking to
qualify for a code-authorized benefit, the annual exclusion? Or is it rendered unavailable by the decision in
Hackl — or, on the premise that Hackl was wrongly
decided, by the unsettled nature of the issue?
That question, in turn, raises a question about the
meaning of the tax shelter regulation itself. Consider, for
example, a taxpayer who acquires an asset to secure the
benefits of accelerated depreciation (a benefit explicitly
referenced in Treas. reg. section 1.6662-4). Assume the
taxpayer uses a depreciable life of, say, 10 years but the
federal court ultimately concludes that the taxpayer
should have used a 15-year life. Will the taxpayer be
subjected to the more rigorous tax shelter standard on the
penalty question because the deduction was not, under
the court’s holding, permissible? Or will the taxpayer be
able to argue that, even though it was not able to sustain
its position on the substantive issue, the transaction was
not a tax shelter for purposes of the penalty analysis,
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50
See Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74 (1991), acq.
in result 1996-29 IRB 4, Doc 96-19970, 96 TNT 137-13.
51
See Estate of Kohlsaat v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-212,
Doc 97-12671, 97 TNT 89-12.
52
Cf. Long Term Capital Holdings v. U.S., 330 F. Supp.2d 122, 94
AFTR2d 2004-5666, Doc 2004-17390, 2004 TNT 169-15 (D.C.
Conn. 2004) (applying a penalty after finding, on the facts, the
taxpayer could not establish the necessary profit motive); Santa
Monica Pictures, LLC v. Commissioner, supra note 7 (adopting a
similar analysis).
53
Section 10.52 of the circular does not provide a definition of
the term ‘‘willful.’’ Presumably, it will be given content based on
an analogy to its counterpart concept in the criminal tax evasion
context. See, e.g., Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (defining the
term to mean a violation of a known legal duty and indicating
that a subjective good-faith belief, even if objectively unreasonable, will preclude a finding of willfulness). However, section
10.51 of the circular, which is cross-referenced, does define the
terms ‘‘reckless’’ and ‘‘gross incompetence.’’ The definition of
reckless in section 10.51 appears to make community standards
a relevant determinant (inquiring whether the conduct was ‘‘an
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care that a
practitioner should observe’’). See also Treas. reg. section 1.66623(b)(2) (providing that a disregard of a rule or regulation ‘‘is
reckless if the taxpayer makes little or no effort to determine
whether a rule or regulation exists, under circumstances which

that uniformly adopt the taxpayer’s position and that,
based on those rulings, the practitioner invokes the safe
harbor. As suggested, a postadvice definitive decision
would appear to preclude the practitioner from invoking
the definition in a disciplinary proceeding. On those
facts, however, a finding that the practitioner was willful,
reckless, or grossly incompetent would seem difficult, if
not impossible, to sustain.54 Still, it would be helpful if
the circular were amended to make certain that a practitioner who relies on existing decisions (or even a private
letter ruling or the literal provisions of the code or a
regulation) should not be subject to sanction if that
decision is ultimately overturned or not followed.

III. Statements May Fall Into Multiple Categories
It seems very important to recognize that a written
statement may fall under an exception for one Covered
Opinion category (for example, it is not a Reliance
Opinion because it contains a prominently disclosed
‘‘you may not rely on this for penalty protection’’) but
may nonetheless be a Covered Opinion in another category (for example, it is a Marketed Opinion). Therefore,
testing to determine if the written statement falls within
the scope of section 10.35 of the circular generally should
include all potential categories of Covered Opinion. If it
does fall into more than one, the practitioner should
attempt to comply with the ‘‘most strict’’ requirements of
the circular.

A. Suggested Steps to Comply With the Circular
We hope that some of the suggested steps set forth
below will be viewed as practical. If a large number of
practitioners adopts them, any practitioner who follows
them may be in a stronger position to demonstrate that
the practitioner was not reckless, willful, or grossly
incompetent if it is later determined that the written

demonstrate a substantial deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe’’). And while the
definition of gross incompetence does not as explicitly reference
the community standard, it would nonetheless seem to be an
implicit benchmark (gross incompetence ‘‘includes conduct that
reflects gross indifference, preparation which is grossly inadequate under the circumstances, and a consistent failure to
perform obligations to the client’’). The section explicitly contemplates that, in applying those definitions, a pattern of
misconduct will weigh against the practitioner — implying
perhaps that, conversely, an isolated violation will be viewed as
an innocent one not warranting sanction. Finally, it should be
noted that the definitions in section 10.51 appear to be drafted,
in large part, with a narrow focus: Practitioners who give
misleading advice (that is, advice that affirmatively misrepresents or omits material information). It does not, in other words,
focus specifically on the kind of violation addressed in the text:
when practitioners erroneously conclude that their advice does
not violate the rules contained in the circular.
54
Given that private letter rulings may constitute substantial
authority for purposes of section 6662, see Treas. reg. section
1.6662-4(d), a postadvice decision that rejects the approach
taken in the private letter rulings should not render the practitioner culpable.

(Footnote continued in next column.)
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will be denied if the court finds that there was an
understanding that the power-holder would not exercise
the power.50 Thus, even though the courts have not been
particularly receptive to the IRS’s argument that an
understanding had been reached with the powerholder,51 it might be challenging for a practitioner to
invoke the safe harbor when it is nearly certain that the
power will not be exercised.52 In other words, given the
critical nature of the factual question and the difficulty in
assuming that the power may be exercised, the safe
harbor may be of little assistance in this context.
It would seem that if a practitioner relies on the safe
harbor, he should not be sanctioned if, after the advice is
rendered, the Supreme Court adopts the taxpayer’s position, as the tax benefit would have been claimed in a
manner consistent with the code and congressional purpose. Similarly, a practitioner should not be sanctioned
for relying on the safe harbor when a postadvice revenue
ruling favorable to the taxpayer is issued. Conversely, a
postadvice Supreme Court decision adopting the IRS
view may preclude the practitioner from invoking the
safe harbor in the disciplinary context because it has
turned out that the tax benefit was not claimed in a
manner consistent with the code and congressional purpose. As a consequence, conservative practitioners will
likely not rely on the safe harbor in any case where the
issue is unsettled.
Nonetheless — and this is perhaps the most critical
point — if a practitioner relies on the safe harbor in a
context in which the issue is not entirely settled but is
definitively settled against the taxpayer by some postadvice decision (for example, a Supreme Court decision),
the practitioner may be able to avoid sanctions by
establishing a lack of willfulness, recklessness, or gross
incompetence.53 For example, assume that, at the time the
advice is given, there are a series of private letter rulings
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On June 21, 2005, new Circular 230 will become
effective. The circular was issued by the United
States Treasury Department. It sets forth rules that
tax practitioners, including lawyers and certified
public accountants, must follow in providing written statements about certain federal tax issues. A
federal tax issue is a question concerning the federal tax treatment of an item of income, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit, the existence or absence of a
taxable transfer of property (such as whether a
transfer to another is subject to federal gift tax), or
the value of property for federal tax purposes. The
circular covers much more than formal legal opinions and may apply to any writing relating to any
Internal Revenue Code matter, including e-mail
messages. Practitioners who fail to comply with the
circular may be suspended or disbarred from practice before the Internal Revenue Service (such as
filing a return or participating in the audit of a
United States tax return), be publicly censured, or
be fined. Unfortunately, we and many others anticipate that the circular may increase the cost of
delivering certain written material to taxpayers.
The circular requires that certain written statements
contain disclaimers or warnings and you will see
new statements in some messages from us, including e-mail messages. All responsible tax practitioners will follow the requirements of the circular. It
is our intention to continue to deliver the highest
quality services to you and in a cost efficient
manner. Please call us if you have any question
about how the circular may affect our representation of you.
It is also recommended that you mention the circular
to any new client and ‘‘warn’’ the client that any written
engagement letter will contain a statement about it.
2. E-mail disclaimers. Consider having a statement permanently embedded at the beginning of each e-mail
message stating something like ‘‘Please review the ‘Disclaimers’ contained toward the end of this message
before reading this message.’’ The disclaimer messages
could appear before the now standard ‘‘confidentiality’’
message contained at the end of virtually all e-mail
messages sent by professionals and may state something
like ‘‘Unless expressly stated otherwise above, (1) nothing contained in this message was intended or written to
be used, can be used by any taxpayer, or may be relied on
or used by any taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding
penalties that may be imposed on the taxpayer under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, (2) any
written statement contained in this message relating to
any federal tax transaction or matter may not be used by
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any person to support the promotion or marketing of or
to recommend any federal tax transaction(s) or matter(s)
addressed in this message, and (3) any taxpayer should
seek advice based on the taxpayer’s particular circumstances from an independent tax adviser with respect to
any federal tax transaction or matter contained in this
message. No one, without our express prior written
permission, may use any part of this letter/memorandum in promoting, marketing, or recommending an
arrangement relating to any federal tax issue to one or
more taxpayers. It may not be shared with any other
person without our prior written consent other than as
required by law or by ethical rules. This prohibition on
sharing this letter/memorandum does not preclude you
from sharing with others the federal tax nature of any
transaction discussed herein or the fact that you may
have consummated such transaction.’’
Although the foregoing will not necessarily ensure
compliance in all cases with the circular, it may reduce
the risk of being charged with knowing or having reason
to know that it will be used or referred to by a person in
promoting, marketing, or recommending an arrangement to one or more taxpayers and therefore may reduce
the risk of the e-mail constituting a Marketed Opinion.
Obviously, if the practitioner knows or suspects that the
written statement is a Marketed Opinion, the suggested
e-mail disclaimer alone will not be sufficient to have
prevented the practitioner from violating section 10.35 of
the circular.
In any case, as indicated, if you intend the addressee to
be able to rely on the e-mail, you should so expressly
state.
3. Certain potential Marketed Opinions. In any written
statement that discusses any federal tax issue and that the
practitioner does not intend to be a Marketed Opinion,
add a statement to the effect that ‘‘ No one, without our
express prior written permission, may use any part of
this letter/memorandum in promoting, marketing, or
recommending an arrangement relating to any federal
tax issue. Furthermore, it may not be shared with any
other person without our prior written consent other
than as required by law or by ethical rules. However, this
prohibition on sharing this letter/memorandum does not
preclude you from sharing with others the nature of this
transaction or the fact that you consummated it.’’55
Such a statement should help demonstrate that the
drafter of the written statement did not know or have
reason to know that someone would use it in promoting,
marketing, or recommending any federal tax transaction
or matter contained in the statement to any other taxpayer.
4. Use a decision-tree approach. The rules of the circular
are complex. It is recommended that practitioners use a

55
We suggest that this last sentence be included to prevent
this advice from being viewed as a Covered Opinion on the
grounds that it is confidential. See Circular 230, section
10.35(b)(6). It is ironic that to avoid Covered Opinion status, the
practitioner will be required, as a practical matter, to inform
clients that they have the right to disclose the nature of the
strategy to others.
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statement does not comply with the circular, as the
practitioner probably will be found to have conformed to
the community standard.
1. Advise clients the circular is coming. Some practitioners will find it appropriate to advise clients in writing
about the circular, that it will change how written statements must be prepared, and that it may increase the cost
of written work relating to any federal tax matter. A short
letter or memorandum might contain something like the
following:

COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT

56

See Circular 230, section 10.37.

avoidance should be considered (as long as a Listed
Transaction is not involved) so compliance with the
circular can be simplified.
8. Drafting guidelines to comply with section 10.35.
Consider the following approach in drafting a written
statement that may constitute a Covered Opinion.
a. Comply with the strictest standard. It may be
critical to realize that a written statement may
constitute more than one type of Covered Opinion.
If so, ensure compliance with the most ‘‘strict’’ rules
(for example, those for Marketed Opinions that
prohibit an overall conclusion at a confidence level
of less than more likely than not).57
b. Include an introductory statement about the
circular. Consider beginning any written statement
that will constitute a Covered Opinion with an
introductory statement that it is a Covered Opinion.
That introductory statement might be as follows:
‘‘This letter/memorandum constitutes a Covered
Opinion within the meaning of Circular 230. The
circular was promulgated by the United States
Treasury Department and requires that certain written statements issued by a tax practitioner, called
Covered Opinions, contain certain material and
requires a specific manner of presentation. Important terms contained in the circular and used herein
are defined at the end of this letter/memorandum.
This letter/memorandum is drafted in a manner
designed to comply with the circular.’’
c. Have a separate definitions section. Circular 230
contains many unique or special terms, such as
Covered Opinion, Significant Federal Tax Issue,
Listed Transaction, Principal Purpose, and Marketed Opinion. It may be that each written statement that deals with the circular will be easier to
prepare and will be easier to read if these definitions are contained in a separate section of the
written statement entitled something like ‘‘Definition of Terms Relating to Circular 230.’’ This section
may become standard practice similar to setting
forth definitions in forms for articles of incorporation or for partnership agreements in a separate
‘‘Definitions’’ section.
d. State the type of Covered Opinion or why the
writing is not a Covered Opinion and the reason
for that conclusion. State the type or types of
Covered Opinion(s) the writing constitutes or why
it is not a Covered Opinion.58

57
Of course, even if the written statement is not a Marketed
Opinion, the practitioner may not be able to reach a more likely
than not conclusion.
58
It may be that some practitioners would find that adding
this type of ‘‘gobbly-gook’’ will be confusing for a client and is
neither necessary nor appropriate to be contained in the letter
and that the conclusion reached as to why the written statement
is not a Covered Opinion, or the type of Covered Opinion, etc.,
should be recorded in a separate internal memorandum. However, there may be two reasons to place those matters in the
written statement to the client. First, if the IRS reads the letter, it

(Footnote continued on next page.)

TAX NOTES, June 20, 2005

1543

(C) Tax Analysts 2005. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

decision-tree approach when reviewing a writing to
determine if it is a Covered Opinion and, if so, what kind
or kinds. For example, the first question should probably
be something like, ‘‘Does the writing discuss any federal
tax issue?’’ If not, the circular’s Covered Opinion rules
should not apply. But if the answer is ‘‘yes,’’ ask, ‘‘Does
the writing relate solely to preliminary advice?’’ If it does,
it’s excluded from being a Covered Opinion. If it does
not, ask, ‘‘Does the writing relate to the qualification of a
qualified plan, state and local bonds, or matters involving
SEC disclosure?’’ If so ask, ‘‘Does the arrangement involve a Listed Transaction or, if not, is the principal
purpose of the arrangement tax avoidance or evasion?’’
And so on.
We hope that the chart attached to this report may
serve as a general guide in determining if the circular
applies and, if it does, why.
5. Approach Listed Transactions with caution. Do not
discuss in writing any Listed Transaction (or principal
purpose transaction) without careful compliance with the
circular’s rules. Remember that true ‘‘negative’’ advice is
an exception to the application of section 10.35. But even
in that case, other sections of the circular (for example,
section 10.37) may apply. Of course, the practitioner
needs to know what the Listed Transactions are. For a
cumulative list of Listed Transactions, see IRS Notice
2004-67, 2004-41 IRB 600, Doc 2004-19024, 2004 TNT
187-8, for the list through the date that notice was issued.
For more recent transactions, see http://www.irs.gov/
businesses/corporations. Click on ‘‘Abusive Tax Shelters
and Transactions.’’ Then click on ‘‘Listed Abusive Tax
Shelters and Transactions.’’ The list is frequently updated.
6. Obtain a representation of principal purpose in some
cases. In some cases, it will be appropriate to obtain a
statement from the taxpayer as to the principal purpose
of the arrangement. Although the circular does not
contain an explicit discussion about when a practitioner
may rely on factual representations in determining
whether the written statement will constitute a Covered
Opinion or the type of that opinion, it is likely that the
practitioner may not rely on an unreasonable or unfounded representation for those purposes.56
7. Determine if the tax benefits are claimed in a manner
consistent with the code and congressional purpose. It
may greatly reduce the cost of compliance with the
circular if the principal purpose of the arrangement is not
tax avoidance and is not a Listed Transaction — for
example, the practitioner may then issue a Limited Scope
Opinion. A practitioner generally can objectively determine if the arrangement is a Listed Transaction. Although
the determination of principal purpose for an arrangement normally could be viewed as making a subjective
determination, the circular, as now amended, provides
that the principal purpose of the arrangement will not be
tax avoidance if the tax benefits are claimed in a manner
consistent with the code and congressional purpose. This
new test to determine if the principal purpose is tax
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is likely that the IRS can reasonably conclude that the practitioner was not willful, etc. regarding some Circular 230 offense.
Second, some practitioners may neglect to prepare the internal
memo on account of time, etc.
59
Of course, additional disclosures are required for Limited
Scope Opinions. See Circular 230, section 10.35(c)(3)(v).
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broken down by headings — for example, ‘‘Facts,’’
‘‘Application of the Law to the Facts,’’ ‘‘Overall
Conclusions,’’ ‘‘Promoter Relationship,’’ ‘‘Reliance
on the Opinion of Another,’’ and so forth as required by the circular. That should increase the
chances of compliance at least with the form of the
Covered Opinion rules and help to demonstrate
that the practitioner was not willful, reckless, or
grossly incompetent if some ‘‘technical’’ violation
of the circular is found to have occurred.
f. Recite the origin of facts. Recite in the facts
section the source of the facts. In some cases, that
might be ‘‘You have represented to us that the
following facts apply to the arrangement. We have
relied on your representations in preparing this
letter/memorandum. If any of the facts are incorrect or incomplete, our discussion and conclusion
may be different than those set forth below. You
have agreed that we are under no obligation and
we expressly disavow any obligation to advise you
if we learn that the facts are not as you have
represented to us.’’ However, keep in mind that you
may not rely on unreasonable facts.
g. Recite the state of the law. Although not required or suggested by the circular but apparently
standard practice at many sophisticated firms, it
seems appropriate to consider stating expressly —
perhaps in the introductory section — that the
written statement is prepared under the current
state of the law. Such a statement might be something like ‘‘We have prepared this letter/
memorandum under what we believe to be the
current state of the law. You have agreed that we are
under no obligation and we expressly disavow any
obligation to advise you with respect to any development or other change in the law that would affect
the discussion or any conclusion contained in this
letter/memorandum.’’
h. State whether the written statement is intended
to be relied on. It seems appropriate to state
whether you know if the client is intending to rely
on the written statement for purposes of tax penalty
protection or otherwise or is not intending to so
rely. For example, if the client is not intending to
rely on it for tax penalty protection, something like
the following might be contained in the written
statement and might be set forth in a separate
section with the separate heading entitled, perhaps,
‘‘No Reliance Intended. You have advised us that you
understand that nothing contained in this letter/
memorandum may be used or relied on by you (or
any other taxpayer) for purposes of penalty protection under the Internal Revenue Code.’’ However, if
the client will be relying on it, the separate heading
and statement might be something like: ‘‘Reliance
for Penalty Protection. We are sending you this
letter/memorandum and understand that you will
be relying on it to avoid certain potential penalties
that might otherwise be imposed by the Internal
Revenue Code with respect to one or more matters
discussed herein. Our opinion is not binding on the
Internal Revenue Service, any court, or any other
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For example, if it is determined that the written
statement is a Reliance Opinion, consider setting
forth the reasoning for that conclusion, such as:
‘‘Type of Covered Opinion. We have determined that
no federal tax issue discussed in this letter relates to
a Listed Transaction. We have also determined that
the tax benefits discussed in this letter are being
claimed in accordance with provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and the underlying Congressional purpose and, therefore, we believe the principal purpose of the arrangement is not tax
avoidance (or evasion). We have determined that a
significant purpose of the arrangement discussed in
this letter may be tax avoidance and, as set forth
below, we have reached a more likely than not
conclusion with respect to one or more Significant
Federal Tax Issues we discuss below. We are not
aware and believe we have no reason to think that
this letter will be used to promote, market, or
recommend to another taxpayer any federal tax
transaction or matter discussed herein. Accordingly, we have determined that this letter may
constitute a Reliance Opinion but no other type of
Covered Opinion. Therefore, we have prepared this
letter in a manner that we believe complies with
requirements of Circular 230 with respect to Reliance Opinions.’’
Similarly, if the written statement that would constitute a Reliance Opinion is not one because it does
not reach a confidence level of at least more likely
than not, it should so state. Such a statement might
be something like: ‘‘Although a significant purpose
of the arrangement discussed herein may be tax
avoidance, we have determined that this letter does
not constitute a Reliance Opinion because we do
not set forth a conclusion that it is at least more
likely than not that the tax treatment would be
sustained.’’ If the reason the written statement is
not a Reliance Opinion is because no Significant
Federal Tax Issue is involved, it seems appropriate
to so state.
If the arrangement does not involve a Listed Transaction and its principal purpose is not tax avoidance and the Covered Opinion is intended to be a
Limited Scope Opinion, a statement must be made
to the effect that ‘‘This writing is intended to
constitute a Limited Scope Opinion.’’ As mentioned
above, explanations of significant terms (for example, a Reliance Opinion or Limited Scope Opinion) may be set forth in the section entitled ‘‘Definition of Terms Relating to Circular 230’’ of the
letter/memorandum.59
e. Use separate headings for separate sections.
Consider having each part of the Covered Opinion

COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT

60

See note 61 below, dealing with return-related advice.
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avoid a penalty by relying on the advice of a practitioner
may do so whether the advice is written or oral (although
it might be anticipated that the IRS may contend that a
taxpayer should not be able reasonably to rely on oral
advice). Because, in the case of oral advice, no written
statement will be delivered to a taxpayer, it will not have
to comply with any parts of the circular (other than
section 10.34).61 In such a case, it may be appropriate to
advise the client why the advice will not be in writing
and, to be able to prove the oral advice was given to the
client, prepare an internal memo that recites the oral
advice given. The recording of the advice probably
should not be set forth in diary entries because those are
often given to the client in connection with billing
matters and those diary entries might therefore have to
comply with the circular because they are a written
statement delivered to the client.
11. Consider forming a Circular 230 committee. Although it will not be practical for solo and many smallfirm practitioners, larger firms may wish to consider
forming a committee that will develop expertise and be
able to advise about compliance with the circular. At
some firms the committee may review written statements
(such as formal opinion letters) to ensure compliance
with the circular. That review presumably would include
the form of the written statement (for example, noting
that all facts are contained in one section of the writing)
and substance of the circular (for example, if the writing
does not reach a more likely than not level of confidence,
ensure it states why it does not).
12. Provide an opinion at a lower level of confidence
when only that lower level is needed for penalty
protection. As stated in our prior article, a taxpayer may
avoid penalties in some cases even though the level of
confidence reached by the adviser is lower than more
likely than not, such as when the issue involves an estate,
gift, or generation-skipping transfer tax matter when
only a reasonable basis is needed (nonnegligence). When
the practitioner concludes that the written statement
would be only a Reliance Opinion and involves a tax
issue for which a more likely than not opinion is not
needed to provide penalty protection, the practitioner
can avoid compliance with section 10.35 (although section 10.37 would still apply) by rendering an opinion at
the lower standard needed to avoid penalties.62 Because

61
Under section 10.34 of the circular, practitioners who give
return-related advice must satisfy at least one of two rules: (1)
the practitioner determines that the position to be taken by the
taxpayer on the return has a realistic possibility of being
sustained on the merits, or (2) the position is not frivolous and
the practitioner advises the taxpayer on the possibility of
avoiding the accuracy-related penalty in section 6662 through
adequate disclosure and the requirements for adequate disclosure.
62
Because a more-likely-than-not opinion can be inferred
from the use of words like ‘‘should,’’ ‘‘would,’’ or ‘‘is likely to
be,’’ practitioners should avoid using such words when giving
an opinion at a lower standard then more-likely-than-not.
Alternatively, practitioners may include an express statement
that no advice given is intended or should be construed to
render a more-likely-than-not level of confidence.
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person or entity. We are providing this letter/
memorandum solely for your use. We cannot assure you and do not guarantee that it will prevent
the imposition of any penalty that might be imposed by the Internal Revenue Code.’’
In addition, if the written statement is intended to
protect the client from one or more tax penalties, it
may well be appropriate to have a separate section
of the written statement discuss the potential penalties and how they may be avoided (for example,
good faith and a reasonable basis for taking the
position or substantial authority). As indicated in
our April 4 article, the avoidance of some penalties
appears to be based on a wholly objective standard
(for example, in some cases, whether there is substantial authority) while others are based, at least in
part, on a reasonable belief or reasonably following
the advice of a professional. In all cases, it seems,
the client’s chances will be increased if the client
can demonstrate reasonable reliance on professional advice and, therefore, a discussion about
potential penalties and why the practitioner concludes they should not apply seems appropriate to
consider reciting in the written statement.60
9. Obtain a second opinion/private ruling in some
cases. It may be appropriate in some cases to seek the
opinion of another tax practitioner as to whether the
circular applies and/or whether the written statement
prepared complies with the circular. Seeking and following expert advice should go far in demonstrating that the
practitioner was not willful, reckless, or grossly incompetent. In cases of substantial doubt, the practitioner
might consider inquiring whether the IRS would issue a
private letter ruling and, if it will, obtaining one. One
circumstance in which a ruling might be sought may be
when a practitioner is preparing a Marketed Opinion for
a client — for example, a brochure for a bank about Roth
IRAs. The circular requires that all Significant Federal Tax
Issues be discussed. It may not be possible for the
practitioner to reach an overall conclusion that is at least
a more likely than not level of confidence because some
Significant Federal Tax Issue is uncertain and could cause
the arrangement to fail to provide the tax benefit sought
by a Roth IRA. (It is appropriate to emphasize that all
Significant Federal Tax Issues must be discussed except
for a Limited Scope Opinion; a Marketed Opinion cannot
be rendered as a Limited Scope Opinion.) It may be that
the IRS will provide practical guidance in such a case that
will allow the practitioner to issue the Marketed Opinion
without running afoul of the circular. In any case, once a
private letter ruling is obtained, it would seem virtually
certain that the IRS would be precluded from contending
that the practitioner violated the circular.
10. Oral advice with an internal memo. In some cases,
the cost of complying with the circular will be so substantial, compared to the issue involved, that it will be
appropriate to provide only oral advice to the client and
then prepare an internal written record of what was
stated. It seems nearly certain that a taxpayer who can
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IV. Conclusion
The May 18 amendments to Circular 230 provide three
new areas of exclusion: written advice after the tax return
is filed; written advice provided by in-house counsel
solely about the employer’s tax return; and negative
written advice. Although each of those is quite limited in
scope, they will be helpful to practitioners in certain
cases. The more significant amendment relates to a
clarification of the meaning of ‘‘principal purpose,’’
which provides that an arrangement’s principal purpose
is not tax avoidance (or evasion) if the tax benefits are

63
The standards under section 10.37 are not substantively
different from those in section 10.35 in many respects although
the ‘‘formalities’’ are less rigid.
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claimed in a manner consistent with the code and congressional purpose. Although the meaning of the clarification is far from clear and may apply only if the tax
position claimed is sustained, it probably means that it
will be difficult to successfully charge a practitioner with
willful, reckless, or grossly incompetent failure to comply
with the circular when the practitioner was not unreasonable — though wrong — in concluding that the tax
benefit is consistent with the statute and congressional
purpose. In other words, we believe that conforming to
the community standard in reaching such a conclusion
will make it difficult, if not impossible, for a fact-finder to
conclude that the practitioner was willful, reckless, or
grossly incompetent. Being able to avoid principal purpose status is important because it may allow the practitioner to provide the written advice under the less
onerous Reliance Opinion standard (or avoid Covered
Opinion status entirely if no Significant Federal Tax Issue
is involved or the practitioner does not provide a more
likely than not opinion). Finally, the circular, as drafted,
would appear to be invalid, at least as applied in certain
contexts. We anticipate that one or more professional
organizations may challenge the circular on the grounds
suggested. (Chart begins on p. 1547; decision tree is
found on p. 1550.)
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the cost of complying with section 10.35 may be significant, issuing the opinion at the lower threshold may be
acceptable to certain clients but it may be appropriate to
state so expressly in the written statement. That will
provide the client with the necessary penalty protection
and yet not have to comply with section 10.35 of the
circular.63
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Exception for Advice on Qualified
Plan Qualification, State and
Local Bonds, Matters Involving
SEC Disclosure
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No

1550

Yes

The Advice is a Covered
Opinion and must comply with the
requirements contained in section 10.35.
It may be drafted as a Limited Scope
Opinion.
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THIS DECISION TREE MAY NOT BE USED FOR PENALTY PROTECTION
DECISION TREE FOR POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF CIRCULAR 230, SECTION 10.35
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Writings include e-mail messages and faxes. Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(2)(i). The Circular consistently uses,
without definition, the term ‘‘Advice’’ which may include any written statement concerning a federal tax issue.
2
A federal tax issue is a question concerning the federal tax treatment of an item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or
credit, the existence or absence of a taxable transfer of property, or the value of property for federal tax purposes. Circular
230, section 10.35(b)(3).
3
The exclusion for preliminary advice is for written advice provided during the course of an engagement if the
practitioner is reasonably expected to provide subsequent written advice to the client that will satisfy the requirements
for Covered Opinions. Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(A).
4
Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(B).
5
This exclusion applies only when the written advice is provided after the taxpayer has filed a tax return with the IRS
if it is solely for use by the taxpayer and if the practitioner neither knows nor has reason to know that the advice will
be used by the taxpayer to take a position on a tax return (including an amended return that claims ‘‘tax benerfits’’ not
reported on a previously filed return) filed after the date on which the advice is provided to the practitioner. Circular
230, section 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(C).
6
Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(D).
7
This exclusion applies only if the advice does not reach a conclusion that suggests at any level of confidence that the
taxpayer might prevail. For example, the negative advice exclusion does not apply if the practitioner concludes that the
treatment in favor of the taxpayer is not frivolous. Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(E).
8
A Covered Opinion includes advice arising from a transaction that is the same as or substantially similar to a
transaction that, at the time the advice is rendered, the IRS had determined to be a tax avoidance transaction and
identified by published guidance as a ‘‘Lisited Transaction’’ under Treas. reg. section 1.6011-4(b)(2). Circular 230, section
10.35(b)(2)(i)(A). For a list of Listed Transactions, see IRS Notice 2004-67 for the list through the date that the notice was
issued and, for more recent transactions, see http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations.
9
A Marketed Opinion is one that the practitioner knows or has reason to know will be used or referred to by another
to promote, etc., an arrangement to a taxpayer. Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(5)(i).
10
If a tax benefit is claimed in a manner consistent with the statute and congressional purpose, the principal purpose
of the arrangement is neither tax avoidance nor tax evasion. Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(10). Therefore, the written
advice need not comply with the rules under section 10.35 of the circular related to principal purpose arrangements.
11
If it cannot be determined that the tax benefit is claimed in a manner consistent with the statute and congressional
purpose, the written advice need not comply with the rules under section 10.35 of the Circular related to Principal
Purpose arrangements if the taxpayer’s principal purpose is not tax avoidance or evasion. Circular 230, section
10.35(b)(2)(i)(B).
12
Circular 230, section 10.35(b).
13
Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(5)(i).
14
Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C)(3). Conditions of Confidentiality are defined in section 10.35(b)(6).
15
Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C)(4). Contractual protection is defined in section 10.35(b)(7).
16
A federal tax issue is significant if the IRS has a reasonable basis for a successful challenge and its resolution could
have a significant impact, whether beneficial or adverse and under any reasonably foreseeable circumstance, on the
overall federal tax treatment of the transaction(s) or matter(s) addressed in the opinion. Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(3).
17
Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(4)(i).
18
Circular 230, section 10.35(b)(4)(ii). The full statement is ‘‘For purposes of this section, written advice, other than
advice described in paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A) of this section (concerning listed transactions) or paragraph (b)(2)(i)(B) of this
section (concerning the principal purpose of avoidance or evasion), is not treated as a reliance opinion if the practitioner
prominently discloses in the written advice that it was not intended or written by the practitioner to be used, and that
it cannot be used by the taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding penalties that may be imposed on the taxpayer.’’

